INTRODUCTION
Ž . Ever since Harsanyi's 1967᎐1968 work on games with incomplete information, type spaces have been the most important tool for the study of such games. In most applications of type spaces to economics, it is assumed that players' beliefs can be derived from a common prior. Such a prior can be interpreted simply as the beliefs in a previous period. However, as we are interested in the players at the present time, it is desirable to express the assumption of a common prior in present time terms only. Thus, two question naturally arise:
1. How can we tell, by players' beliefs, that they have a common prior?
2. Can a common prior be expressed in terms of, or constructed from, the players' beliefs in a meaningful way? Ž . Aumann 1976 , in his agreement theorem, gave a necessary condition for the existence of a common prior in terms of present beliefs: if there is a common prior, then it is impossible to agree to disagree, i.e., to have common knowledge of differences in the beliefs of any given event. By extending the notion of disagreement to differences in the expectation of a Ž general random variable, several authors Morris, 1995; Feinberg, 1995;  . Bonanno and Nehring, 1996 were able to show that the impossibility of there being common knowledge of disagreement is not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior. The different proofs for the sufficiency of this condition use various derivatives Ž . of the separation theorem for convex sets. Samet 1998 showed how the condition follows directly from the simple observation that the set of priors of a player is the convex hull of his types.
The first question mentioned above was solved satisfactorily by this necessary and sufficient condition, but it gave no clue as to the second question: the fact that a disagreement cannot be common knowledge, which guarantees the existence of a common prior, tells us nothing about this common prior.
In this work a new necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior on a finite type space is given, in terms of present beliefs only. Unlike the previously known condition, this one also answers our second question: it provides a meaningful way to express the common prior in terms of present beliefs.
To understand the new condition, consider the following story. Suppose we ask Eve what return she expects on IBM stock. Being an expert economist, Eve has no problem providing us with an answer. Adam, when asked the same question, will also come up with an answer. Even if Eve and Adam attended the same school of economics, we should not be surprised to hear different answers, because since then they have been exposed to different sources of information. Now, let us ask Eve what she thinks Adam's answer was. Eve scratches her head, and for good reason. She can think of many answers that Adam might have given. Being a Bayesian economist, she can compute, though, the expectation of the various answers and come up with Adam's expected answer. Likewise, Adam, will provide us with what he expects Eve's answer to be. Again, we do not anticipate that the answers at this stage will be the same.
We continue the process, moving back and forth between Eve and Adam, asking each to compute the expected value of the other's previous answer. Here is the good news: the two sequences of alternating expectations, the one that starts with Adam and the one that starts with Eve, converge. Moreover, the limits of these sequences are common knowledge to Adam and Eve.
The first question posed above is now answered by proving that there exists a common prior for Adam and E¨e, if and only if, starting with any possible stock, the sequences thus generated con¨erge to the same limit.
The second question is answered by showing that if there is a common prior, then the common¨alue of the limit of the sequences is the expected alue of the stock with respect to the common prior. Thus, the expected values of all possible stocks, with respect to the common prior, which fully describe the common prior, are given in terms of the limits of sequences, which are computed by the present beliefs of Eve and Adam. Now we give a somewhat more formal description of our results, and show how they generalize to more than two players. The characterization of a common prior in this work is based on the stochastic nature of types and priors, rather than their convex structure, which, as we mentioned before, was used in the previous characterization. The following simple observation is the starting point. Consider, then, the Markov matrix M , the rows and columns of which i are indexed by states, and each row of which is the type of player i in the state corresponding to the row. This matrix can be used in two ways. For any function f on the state space, written as a column vector, M f is the i vector of the expected values of f in each state. Another use, which is in a sense dual to the first, primal one, is to consider for any probability measure p on the state space, the probability measure pM , obtained from i p after one transition of the Markov chain.
The primal use is of economic significance and importance. Players and traders choose their actions by comparing the expectation of certain functions, and this is what state spaces are used to describe. The dual use is not as natural for state spaces, since no stochastic process is going on and since we are not interested in general probability measures on the state space.
Nevertheless, the dual use of M is of importance, because the invariant i probability measures of M are exactly the priors of player i. Thus, a i common prior is a probability measure which is invariant for the matrices M for all players i. The relation between the primal and dual aspects of the matrices M is i what enables us to translate the question of existence of a common prior to a question concerning the primal use of these matrices, namely, the computation of expected values. Moreover, it also makes it possible to express a common prior in terms of expectations. The stochastic analysis of type spaces is finer than the convex analysis used for the nonagreement condition. Thus, while both analyses can be used to characterize the existence of a common prior, it is only the stochastic approach that makes it possible to express the prior in terms of players' present belief, and also accounts for the uniqueness of a common prior, on elements of the meet, as we prove here. For further applications Ž . of stochastic analysis of type spaces, see Gaifman 1986 , and Samet Ž . 1997 . We present type spaces, and state the main results in the next section. The interpretation of type functions as transition functions of Markov chains and all the proofs are given in Section 3.
TYPE SPACES, PRIORS, AND COMMON PRIORS
Ä 4 Let I s 1, . . . , n be a set of players and let ⍀ be a finite set of size m, the elements of which are called states.
Ž . element of ⌸ containing . For each i g I and g ⍀, let t be a i i probability measure on ⍀, such that:
The function t is i's type function, and t is i's type at . The tuple
is the partition ⌸ of ⍀ which is the finest among
all partitions that are coarser than ⌸ for each i g I. For an event A, the i event that A is common knowledge is the union of all the elements of ⌸ contained in A. We observe that any element P in the meet ⌸ forms a type space when the partitions ⌸ and the types t are restricted to it, and i i Ä 4 the meet of this space is P . We identify any probability measure on P with its natural extension to a probability measure over all of ⍀.
We consider probability measures on ⍀ as row vectors in the m-dimensional space R ⍀ . A random¨ariable is a real-valued function on ⍀, which we consider as a column vector in R ⍀ . For a probability measure p and a random variable f on ⍀, the expectation of f with respect to p is the
A prior for player i is a probability measure p on ⍀, such that for each Ž Ž .. state , if p ⌸ ) 0, then i's type at is the conditional probability ity measure is defined. The probability measure p is a common prior if it is a prior for each player i. Ž .ŽÄ 4. In the sequel we assume that for each i and , t )0. Our i results do not hold without this positivity assumption, but similar results can be proved for the general case. To formulate such results, the notion of common knowledge, which plays a central role here, should be replaced Ž Ž . . by common 1-belief as defined in Monderer and Samet 1989 . In particular, the role played by the elements of the meet is played, in the general case, by events E which are minimal nonempty events for which E is the common 1-belief in E. Under the positivity assumption, the elements of the meet are those minimal events. We make the positivity assumption in order to simplify the formulation and the proofs of the main results.
We present here necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a common prior which result from the stochastic nature of type spaces explored in the next section.
First, we show in the following proposition that the question of existence of a common prior on ⍀ can be reduced to the question of the existence of common priors on the elements of the meet. PROPOSITION 1. For each P g ⌸ there exists at most one common prior on P. The set of common priors on ⍀ is the con¨ex hull of the common priors on the elements P in ⌸.
Ž
. We need the following definitions. We call a sequence s s i , i , . . . , of 1 2 elements of I, an I-sequence if for each player i, i s i for infinitely many k ks. The iterated expectation of a random variable f with respect to the Ž . ϱ I -sequence s is the sequence of random variables E иии E f .
. For each random¨ariable f on ⍀ and I-sequence s, the limit of the iterated expectation of f with respect to s exists and its¨alue is common knowledge in each state; that is, it is constant on each element P in ⌸.
In view of Proposition 1, there exists a common prior on ⍀ iff there exists a common prior on at least one of the elements of the meet. Thus it is enough to characterize the existence of a common prior for the case that the meet consists of only one element. 
Ž n.
PROPOSITION 4. For any permutation of I, the meet, ⌸, is a partition of ⍀ into irreducible, aperiodic, classes of M . Thus, the restriction of M to any
P g ⌸ is ergodic and therefore has a unique in¨ariant probability measure p P on P.
Therefore, any two states in the same element of a partition of a player Ž . communicate. Hence, if is in an equivalence class of states, then ⌸ , i for each i, is a subset of this class. This means that each class is a union of elements of ⌸. Also, for each P g ⌸, the probability of g P staying in P under M is 1, and therefore P is an irreducible equivalence class. The Ž . Ž . implies 3 . Suppose 3 is true and let p be the invariant probability Ž . measure in 3 . Thus,
Multiplying this equality from the right by M yields
Therefore, pM is an invariant probability measure of M иии M M . 1 2 n 1 Ž . However, by 3 , p is an invariant probability measure of this Markov matrix, and by Proposition 4, M иии M M has a unique invariant proba-2 n 1 bility measure on each element P g ⌸. Thus, pM s p and, similarly,
Proof of Proposition 1. By Proposition 5, if p is a common prior on P, then it is an invariant probability measure of the restriction of M to P, which is unique by Proposition 4. Let p be a common prior and denote by p P the conditional probability measure of p to P g ⌸, when it exists. Then, clearly, p is a convex combination of the measures p P . It is enough, now, to show that each p P is an invariant probability measure on P. Ž . Indeed, by Proposition 3 b , p is an invariant probability measure of M i Ž . P for each i and, therefore, by Proposition 3 a , p is an invariant probability measure of the restriction of M to P, for each i. Hence, by Proposition i 5, p P is a common prior on P. B
To prove Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, we first prove a variant of these claims. Let be a permutation of I. Denote by E the operator, which is defined for each f by
Žn.
The iterated expectation of a random variable f with respect to in the
Proposition 2Ј and Theorem 1Ј, which follow, correspond to Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, but they are formulated in terms of iterated expectation with respect to permutation rather than I-sequences. PROPOSITION 2Ј. For each random¨ariable f on ⍀ and permutation , the limit of the iterated expectation of f with respect to exists and is measurable with respect to ⌸, i.e., it is constant on each element P in ⌸.
Ä 4 THEOREM 1Ј. Suppose ⌸ s ⍀ . Then there exists a common prior iff for each random¨ariable f, the iterated expectations of f, with respect to all permutations , con¨erge to the same limit. Moreo¨er, if p is the common prior, then this limit is pf.
Note that the iterated expectation of f with respect to a permutation is a subsequence of the iterated expectation of f with respect to the I-sequence, 1 , . . . , n , 1 , . . . , n , . . . ,
Ž .
Ž . Ž . Ž .
and, therefore, the claim of Proposition 2Ј is weaker than that of Proposition 2. In Theorem 1Ј, the claim concerning the sufficiency of the condition for the existence of a common prior is stronger than the corresponding claim in Theorem 1, while the claim concerning its necessity is weaker.
Proof of Theorem 1Ј. As in the proof of Proposition 2Ј,
and the limit is constantly p f on ⍀, where p is the unique invariant probability measure of M on ⍀. Thus, for each f, the limits for all are the same iff for each f, p f are the same for all , which is true iff there is a probability measure p such p s p for all . This amounts, by the Ž . Ž . equivalence of 1 and 3 in Proposition 5, to saying that p is a common prior. B
We turn now to prove Proposition 2 and Theorem 1. We first prove Proposition 6, which generalizes a theorem concerning the convergence of the powers of an ergodic stochastic matrix to the case in which different matrices are multiplied. We then prove Lemma 1, which shows that the conditions of Proposition 6 hold in our case.
We say that a Markov matrix A is bounded by if all its positive entries are bounded from below by ; that is, if for each row r and column c, Ž . Ž . either A r, c s 0 or A r, c ) . We say that A is positi¨e if all its entries are positive. Proof. It is enough to show that for each column vector x, A Ž k . x converges to a vector all the components of which are identical. Indeed, if we prove this, then substituting unit vectors for x shows the existence of the limit matrix A with the desired property.
For a vector x write max x for the maximal coordinate x and min x for i the minimal one. If A is a Markov matrix and y s Ax, then max y F max x and min y G min x. Moreover, if A is positive and bounded by ) 0, then Ž . Ž . max y F min x q 1 y max x and min y G max x q 1 y min x, Ž . Ž . and, therefore, max y y min y F 1 y 2 max x y min x .
Thus
is a decreasing sequence and min y Ž k .
is an increasing one. We need to show that max y Ž k . y min y Ž k . ª 0. This is indeed true, as for each l, y Ž k lq 1 y1 . s B иии B x, and, therefore, For each k, define A to be the restriction of M to P. We show that the
in the notation of Proposition 6 converges. For each permutation of I, M is ergodic on P and therefore there is a whole
